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Abstract
Society is structured based on the symbol systems that facilitate communication. Humans are
narrative beings who find their morals and attitudes through interactions with stories that
describe experience and substance. Symbols used to communicate are the representations of
narratives attempting to share some meaning. These narratives are open to a plethora of
interpretations but in order to create a cohesive community leading institutions will push certain
definitions. By the nature of their hegemony dominant societal classes will control narrative and
moral understanding to protect their position. The narratological control of these groups props up
symbols of authority and limits potential attitudes. Kenneth Burke studies this process in his
Attitudes Toward History and comes to find that people either exist in an attitude of acceptance
or rejection towards symbols of authority. This paper looks at how institutions seek to control
and limit discourse, and the findings bring Burke’s theory into question. The power granted to
dominant groups by the nature of their hegemony and the central role played by institutions in
ideological dissemination erases the possibility of a true rejection. As such the attitudes
presented by Burke as existing in a frame of rejection are more aligned with those that appear
during transitional periods. Burke’s attitudes of rejection do not actually seek to reject a frame
but seek to expand it in order to protect against a potential collapse.
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1. - Introduction
During the past decade it has seemed as if a time of transition was on the horizon for the
United States if not the world at large. Politics has polarized populations to the point where it
seems impossible for differing groups to come to an agreement. Countries are divided and each
side seems to be moving toward their own extreme rather than back toward each other. At some
point it seems the US is bound for some great change, where things can return to normal, or as
some might put it when America can be made great again. What is normalcy though, when was
America ever great? During any time period there always feels like some transition is on the
way. What the United States is now experiencing might be unique in detail, but overall, what is
going on is not a new phenomenon. The societal systems currently in place, the institutions that
support a country, are constantly pushing attitudes among their people. Institutions in the realm
of this paper are social structures such as government bodies, education systems, enforcement
agencies, religious organizations, or the media. They are groups that have some form of control
over the thoughts and actions of a large group of people. Institutions will push attitudes that help
maintain their position and control, and often these attitudes can be counter to that of other
institutions or even minority groups within the institution. In order to fully understand the
polarization taking place today and how to best move forward it is important to first look at the
systematic forces behind attitudes and the pressures that attempt to shift them. The current
ideological predicament faced by the United States has not come about by coincidence; it is a
symptom of how society has organized itself and the hegemony in place.
Institutions and individuals promote or alter attitudes through their rhetorical output. The
dialogue surrounding any organization or person has a rhetorical impact based on its persuasive
qualities. When a government sets its budget, it is sharing with the world and its citizens its
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values. Their intrinsic credibility and defense of that budget is then an attempt to persuade people
to share those values. This is a large-scale example that is easy to unpack, but every decision
made from the grandest of organizations to the lowliest person follows this pattern. It is from
studying this process, why people make value decisions and how those decisions change, that the
current situation faced by the US can be made clear. Kenneth Burke was one of the first and
most important rhetorical scholars to investigate this process. Burke dissected common attitudes
present among groups of people and how those attitudes relate to frames (intro. ATH). Frames
are the mindset people exist in that influences how they receive and act on information (4-5
ATH). Burke explains that people can exist in a frame of acceptance or rejection as it is attached
to the dominant ideology of the time. As the names entail frames of acceptance support the
symbols of authority that undergird the dominant ideology and frames of rejection seek to
oppose and replace them (20-21 ATH). Burke also claims that certain attitudes appear as the
result of transitionary times when frames of rejection seek to replace frames of acceptance. The
attitudes that arise during this period seek to subvert the impact of frames of rejection on the
status quo (27 ATH). Burke comes to these conclusions by studying what he calls the curve of
history. He takes a macro level approach to see how great ideological shifts take place, and how
rhetoric changes depending upon what stage in that transition society is in (intro. ATH). Much of
Burke’s work touches upon societal structures and the impact of their rhetoric but one work, his
Attitudes Towards History, seeks to answer these questions of frames. Originally published in
1937 it has stood up extremely well to time. That being said the wide lens approach taken by
Burke simplifies what truly takes place when opposing frames interact with the dominant
group’s hegemony over societal narrative. This paper looks to alter the approach taken by Burke
to see how institutional interactions with individuals might alter Burke’s findings. Burke posits
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that attitudes can exist in a frame of rejection of the dominant view of the symbols of authority of
a time. Looking at how institutions seek to control and limit discourse though, brings these
conclusions into question. The power granted to dominant groups by the nature of their
hegemony and the central role played by institutions in ideological dissemination erases the
possibility of a true rejection. As such the attitudes presented by Burke as existing in a frame of
rejection are more aligned with those that appear during transitional periods. Burke’s attitudes of
rejection do not actually seek to reject a frame but seek to force an expansion of it in order to
protect against a potential collapse.
With all the factors available to the dominant frame to shape thought processes new ideas
that truly reject the accepted frame cannot come to fruition. Burke describes the curve of history
as going from Christian Evangelism to Medieval Synthesis to Protestant Transition to Naive
Capitalism and finally to Emergent Collectivism. He labels each of these periods by the
dominant frame of acceptance that drove thought during each era. Burke sees a new period
beginning when the frame of rejection during the rule of the previous frame becomes the
dominant frame (intro. ATH). By looking at the curve of history on the macro level Burke’s
ideas of rejection make sense, but when studying the daily interaction of these frames the idea
begins to fall apart. Ideology certainly is not constant and changes over time, but its change is
not the result of a framal rejection. Society has been structured by institutions to subdue new
ideas. Public memory and practices of discipline and punishment seek to assert a single frame
over society. A dominant ideology is propped up to unify and empower the state. Subduing new
ideas and limiting identity formation means that for a new frame to gain a following it must be
founded upon the spiritual factors like a grammar of thought or structure of property relations
already bureaucratized in the objective and material order of society (112 ATH). Burke’s
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attitudes within the frame of rejection do seek to alter the dominant symbols of authority, but it is
misleading to say that they reject these ideas. These attitudes instead could be seen in a similar
vein to those that appear in what Burke calls transitionary times. When a frame has created an
outgroup large enough to challenge it, that frame is not replaced instead it is extended to cover
that group. Ideology is not constant; it is shaped by the casuistic stretching of a frame, but the
dominant frame is constant because any change will be born out of pre-existing factors. The
correcting for the faults of these factors is not a rejection of the frame itself it is a continuation.
In the time periods discussed by Burke symbols of authority came to be redefined, but for the
most part they all remained. Some hierarchy stayed in place where an in-group ruled over an outgroup. The economic system changed, but people still worked in order to provide for themselves
and their family. Things change but at the same time they never change by that much. Societal
change is not based upon rejection but by transitional forces that stretch the dominant frame. The
dominant frame might come to look very different then how it has previously, but that is the
result of constant stretching in order to keep what Burke calls the Malthusian limit at bay. The
structures at place in society make the reaching of this limit impossible. The hegemony exerted
by the dominant class does not ever allow for the destruction of a frame. Frames must be worn
away slowly, brought to change as new outgroups come to power and question the accepted
symbols of authority. This paper seeks to break down the qualities of frames and framal shifts
discussed by Burke to show that it is impossible to truly reject symbols of authority. Throughout
this paper many of the terms used by Burke in his description of frames such as symbols of
authority, the bureaucratization of the imagination, Malthusian limits, and casuistic stretching
will be defined and explored to show how symbols of authority never really change. Symbol
systems and their interaction with individuals and society will also be explored to show how the
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overwhelming control of institutions over these systems prevents new symbols of authority from
forming.
This paper takes a theoretical approach to dissecting the work of Kenneth Burke and his
discussion on framal shifts and changing attitudes towards symbols of authority. This approach
was chosen because it allows for greater unpacking of Burke’s work itself in order to show its
incongruity. This work is seeking to prove that the social systems and phenomenon outlined by
Burke work against his overall argument. The ideas presented by Burke that build up to his
overall argument could be studied through a more traditional rhetorical analysis based around a
central artifact, but this approach would have shielded some of the faults in the overall logic.
Alone the social phenomena outlined by Burke are very apparent and do seem to lead to
rejection. It is only through studying the pure theoretical nature of these phenomena that the true
impossibility of rejection on their basis can be discovered. This paper dealt primarily with the
work of Burke and other primary theoretical sources in order to build an argument supported by
the problems of Burke’s work alone. Shaping an argument in this manner aligns itself with the
goal of the paper to show that Burke’s own work is misaligned with itself and therefore
problematic. Other secondary sources on Burke were unnecessary because Burke himself
provides the theoretical material necessary for the dissolution of his ultimate point.

2. - Symbol Systems
Symbol systems are the mechanism by which people communicate. Symbols are the
embodiment of the personal and societal narratives surrounding the object or idea they represent
and evolve with the constantly changing conceptions of those objects and ideas. The theory of
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symbolic action places narrative as the basis for symbolic comprehension. Under this theory,
narrative can be understood as words or deeds that have sequence and meaning for those who
live, create, or interpret them (Fisher 2). Narrative is the essential genre for the characterization
and valuation of human actions and interactions. The selection of a narrative as a means for
valuation hinges upon the competition between stories by their good reasons (2). Narratives are
arguments meant to promote values and are selected by shaping the belief in what is moral. An
unpacking of symbols allows for insight into the interplay between personal and societal
narratives dictated by what is deemed good or valuable and its impact upon society. How societal
narratives come to shape personal ones and dominate society provides evidence for how attitudes
are shaped, and the potential limitations of those attitudes to reject symbols of authority.
Burke begins his quest to understand human thought by trying to settle upon a definition
for humankind. He claims that humankind is the symbol-using animal. Burke finds that in
people's use of symbols a naive verbal realism is clung too in which the role played by
symbolocity in the crafting of notions of reality is ignored (5 LSA). Substances or ideas can only
be communicated through symbol systems and this dependence means that all social interaction
takes place on the symbolic rather than real level. That is not to say that symbols are not real in
that they do not exist, just that they are crafted by people to represent things in the natural world,
like a middleman for understanding. Burke finds people cling to a naive realism because symbols
are viewed as pure representations; yet in reflecting the personal and societal narrative
surrounding a substance or idea as well as the evolution of these narratives, symbols are far from
pure forms of reality. Societal narratives form out of the complex interaction between the
hegemonic ideology and personal beliefs and work to shape personal beliefs towards the
dominant system within society (6 LSA). Due to this interaction Burke finds that it is not enough
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to define humankind as the symbol using animal, but that it must also be added that humankind
is the symbol misusing animal (6 LSA). Just as people come to shape language, so too does
language come to shape people. This sentiment is echoed by Gabriela Dumbrava in her work.
She writes that people, by naming all aspects of the world, come to appropriate the world by
surpassing pure reference and accessing a space of comprehension. Comprehension comes from
placing symbols into stories that reveal past experiences and beliefs rather than just pure
perception and this leads into culturalization (252). Culture then can be explained as a
representative system of values and perceptions made to fit with others (252). Collaboration to
the point of culturalization is important for the progression of society, but in group formation on
such a large level also requires a loss of individual narratological control. Humankind misuses
symbols because instead of using symbols to translate personal narratives, people's personal
narratives become shaped by culturally accepted symbolic definitions. Fisher argues that it is
through stories and their reception that morals and values are accrued. As society gains a greater
control over symbolic definition and symbols continue to be misused dominant societal groups
gain a greater control over defining what is moral (7-8). This thought is also shared by Hayden
White who claims the purpose of historical narrative is the moralization of the events it treats
(18). Society will push specific narratives and symbolic definitions because maintaining
cohesion on a large scale requires a code of shared morals and values that come with a socially
accepted narrative. As society is constantly pulled apart by individual experience and personal
shapings of events the one factor that can maintain a homogenous grouping of people living
different lives is shared definition (Burke 55 PC). The need for a strict definition is what makes
humankind the symbol misusing animal. Predetermined and socially adopted meaning bias
experience and language to shape human thought. Thought is limited and choice is restrained by
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how information is delivered and by what is accepted as being rational. How society shapes these
narratives to be viewed as rational, how symbolic definition is set, explains in part why
humankind exists in its current form and believes what it does.

3. - Symbols of Authority
The leading institutions of a country will shape narrative to support the symbols of
authority that assist in the maintenance of power and popular acceptance. Narratives in support
of hegemony attempt to create positive attitudes towards symbols of authority defined by the
dominant powers. The term, symbols of authority, has come up several times in this paper, but
what exactly does it mean? Ultimately it is a vague concept; yet they can be understood as the
representations of the authoritative structure within society. They are a people’s general attitude
toward any body of control, such as a ruler, court or educator, and the moral slogans linked with
such (Burke 329 ATH). This might seem broad, and it should because symbols of authority are
broad and far reaching in societal systems. The moralizing aspect of narrative discussed by
Fisher and White is directly related to how those narratives value symbols of authority. Fisher
says that narrative is selected based upon its good reasons, but prior to that a narrative must also
be rational. What makes a narrative rational is its ability to satisfy the demands of narrative
probability and fidelity. Essentially a story must be coherent and in the mind of individuals seem
feasible (2). Narratives must be consistent with other narratives already accepted and this is
fulfilled by basing new narratives around accepted symbols of authority.
The interaction with symbols of authority makes these stories acceptable to people,
because the same mechanisms are responsible for an individuals' identity formation. G. Mitchell
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Reyes finds that “individual identities exist by virtue of memories and memories by virtue of
society” (226). Society introduces one to a way of thinking that restricts identity and symbolic
definition to something within the public memory. The version of memory society deems
acceptable for identity formation will be based upon the dominant class’s definition and
hierarchy of symbols of authority. It is the desire of the dominant class to stay in power, and they
act accordingly by pushing their own system of understanding upon others. Symbols of authority
are useful institutional tools because they will limit choice over an adopted group of people.
Personal experience gives rise to how an individual comprehends their world; yet outside
pressure on this personal experience such as symbols of authority work to limit the ideological
range of that comprehension. They come to determine what narratives people find acceptable,
and as such are the basis for all valuation judgements. The acceptance of one definition of a
symbol of authority is the acceptance of a strict moral order that prevents certain understanding
from arising around any narrative. If an institution can spin some moral concept and connect it
with their own interests the institution can cement its place in society because it is by symbols of
authority that people come to orient themselves within society.

4. – Orientation
How people position themselves or are positioned in society is based upon one's attitudes
towards symbols of authority. How attitudes arise around those symbols comes from a complex
process of orientation. Burke describes orientation as a method of selecting meaning (5 PC). Ann
Branaman adds to Burke’s definition when she says that “an orientation is a sense of
relationships, set of beliefs, or worldview by which humans chart future conduct” (446). The

16

processes of orientation then is the selection of a certain view. Existence as a whole is a series of
experiences from which people attempt to orient themselves to align with or against a certain
viewpoint. Burke believes that perspective is decided through a process where meaning or
assigned definition is selected based upon the definitions relation to the meaning that arises from
individual experience. Past actions and the remembrance of those actions determine how one
comprehends the world, and people will gravitate towards societal definitions that are accepting
of their individual experience. Dumbrava writes that conscience is historically determined, but
language’s role as the mediator of one's relation with the world leads to the acquisition of a
degree of freedom within what space one might occupy (252). Institutional control over language
though limits this degree of freedom. Space or rather orientation is determined through
interactions with symbols of authority. Based upon personal experience people might be brought
to attitudes that accept the dominant value hierarchy of symbols of authority or seek to change it.
Regardless of how one is led to view symbols of authority though, those symbols of authority are
still the basis of their orientation and any new ideas that might come about. This again is the
result of narratives need to be rational to be accepted. Narratives for their moral reasoning to be
accepted must base that reasoning upon the accepted structures represented by symbols of
authority (Fisher 2). Narratives might seek to alter how symbols of authority are viewed, but the
necessary connection to them limits the space one might occupy.
Symbols of authority shape how an experience is interpreted in a variety of ways. One
way in which the perception of an experience is altered is through the rise of terministic screens.
Terministic screens are the different filters by which people will understand information based
upon their experience. Different past experiences will provide different filters that will lead to
different perceptions between individuals who might be experiencing the exact same thing
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(Burke 45 LSA). Terministic screens work to prevent understanding between parties by creating
different representations of reality. Burke finds that the terminology used to describe a situation
will directly impact the very nature of the observations that arise from it, and since terminology
is necessary for communication, terministic screens are always present (46 LSA). Terministic
screens act as roadblocks to communication as terminology will impact each individual
differently depending upon past experience, but they can also function as means of orientation.
Terministic screens do not just come about in conversation but will also impact one’s personal
reading of an experience. They will arise in people’s own narratological crafting of an event out
of another past experience that would shape their interpretation. Veblen calls this concept trained
incapacity. He defines trained incapacity as a state of affairs where one’s abilities, resulting from
experience, function as a blindness (Burke quoting Veblen 7 PC). Burke finds that trained
incapacities blind one to certain perspectives, and as a result, nudge individuals towards schools
of thought that fit more within the popular framing of the world (7 PC). By ascribing meaning to
terminology based on past experience and the promotion of certain societal ideas, terministic
screens shroud future experiences. New events will be understood through pre-acknowledged
symbols and confine the discussion of these events to the realm of the terministic screens
brought about by those symbols. How these new ideas interact with pre-existing screens will
determine what definitions of the symbols of authority will be accepted and further strengthened
by encompassing a new idea or altered because they fail to truly represent whatever is
happening.
How does one choose to accept or reject assigned meaning based on how that meaning
personally affects their life? Burke finds when looking into questions of motives that it is
important to first understand that people have a deep desire to avoid unsatisfactory situations (9
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PC). He bases this premise on what he calls the pleasure principle, which is the idea that signs of
experience are characterized with reference to pleasant and unpleasant expectancies (21 PC).
Grouping of the world into this binary wipes out the possibility of individual interpretations
within the spectrum of pleasant and unpleasant and leads to what Burke describes as a faulty
selection of means due to a faulty theory of causal relationships (9 PC). People tend to gravitate
towards the pleasant because humankind's orientation schema is based upon serviceability. Often
the things deemed as good are those things that are most useful to one’s way of life and the
maintenance of their own interests, and in this way moral goodness becomes linked to
serviceability (21 PC). Narratives are selected based upon their good reasons; yet, if these
reasons are really related to serviceability then narratives are selected based upon which is most
beneficial. Symbols of authority gain and maintain power because of their connection to
individual interest. The rejection of the dominant interpretation of a symbol of authority is the
rejection of the current way of life and with that comes significant loss. Using currency as an
example of a symbol of authority, its rejection would reshape all of society. The entire
transactionary process of the capitalist system would collapse, and the great potential for material
gain granted to the supporters of the system would disappear. Although it is not impossible, the
loss associated with denouncing currency would certainly not be considered serviceable to most.
People who have been working their entire lives to earn something that they have been told has
value and that they have seen the value of are going to struggle to give that up even for the
promise of a better life to come. Currency became so entrenched in society because narratives
were shaped to assign it value that led people to support it with good reasons. The moral
grounding of capitalism could be understood to have derived from the benefits money gave to
the powerful and their attempt to maintain that system. Symbols of authority will be accepted or
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rejected based upon their serviceability. The more serviceable a narrative, the more benefits
associated with its acceptance, the more entrenched it becomes in society.

5. - Attitudes of Acceptance
Decisions of acceptance and rejection happen at all levels of society and are responsible
for how symbols of authority are defined and how society will be structured at any given time.
The mechanisms for orientation within symbol systems are structured to push people into one of
two attitudes in society, that of acceptance or rejection of the dominant frames definition of
symbols of authority. For Burke, a frame is much the same as a paradigm, and he studies the
interaction between frames of acceptance and rejection much like Thomas Kuhn studies
paradigm shifts in science. For Kuhn, a paradigm is one’s current view of the world, their beliefs,
their morals and their imagination. The fact that he finds evidence of these in science is evidence
of how widespread an impact frames have on society. Science is considered the realm of
analytical reason, of hypothesis testing and experiment, yet Kuhn still finds that paradigm plays a
major role in how science is practiced regardless of how unbiased the scientific method is
presumed to be. Burke on the other hand studies frames through the lens of literature. He argues
that each of the major poetic categories is representative of an attitude towards the dominant
perspective of the symbols of authority of a time (34 ATH). Literary forms are expressive of the
different attitudes towards symbols of authority because they can be considered what Burke calls
“recordings on the dial” of culture. They are culture and the mindset of a time written down, and
as such make for an accessible tool to break down thought and its formation in society ( intro.
ATH). Dumbrava supports this view. She finds that literature is the most authentic way of
appropriating the world (252). Text and culture are both formed by memory and meant to
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preserve what is meaningful to human experience (258). Burke studies the poetics because they
are metaphors for how attitudes are symbolized in society, and he is looking to understand how
frames come about and change over the curve of history.

5.1. – Epic
Burke outlines three poetic categories that fall within the frame of acceptance: the epic,
the tragedy, and the comedy. Burke sees the epic as the most archaic of the poetic categories. He
believes this to be deliberate as the epic’s archaic nature might suggest some emphasis on
appealing to people's sense of nostalgia (34 ATH). An attitude of the epic, according to Burke, is
designed to make people feel at home in their current condition, and an appeal to nostalgia is a
powerful way of achieving this. The epic often is based around a central heroic figure that one is
meant to identify with. This identification comes from what Burke finds as a general tendency
towards identification between people and a personal symbol of authority such as an epic hero
(77 ATH). The role of the epic hero is to lend dignity to the necessities of life through one's
identification with him or her. Societal attitudes will often adopt the epic hero for this very
purpose. One such instance can be found in the dialogue surrounding soldiers in America.
Soldiers are heroes; they go where duty takes them and serve their country to protect the citizens
who stay behind. At the same time anyone can be a soldier, and everyone knows at least one
soldier, which makes them easy to identify with. A soldier is not responsible for the ideological
reason that brought about war. They are just considered honorable for giving their lives to protect
those ideals and as such lend dignity to the overall conversation surrounding war. War itself
becomes a thing of honor as it is what allows soldiers to truly demonstrate their bravery and
patriotism. The epic hero as a device allows institutions to spin divisive topics such as war into a
positive and more acceptable light by changing the focus of war to an identifiable figure. An epic
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attitude romanticizes the hard realities of the dominant symbols of authority to greater
indoctrinate the populace into the frame of acceptance. The attitude humbles those holding it to
share the worth of the hero and as a result pushes one to accept and wish to protect society as the
hero does (35 ATH). It leads people to accept symbols of authority as the hero does to find the
same comfort and acceptance the hero has achieved by doing the same.
It should not be considered random that soldiers have so often been put in the role of the
epic hero in both literature and society. Soldiers, as told by Michel Foucault, are the ultimate
product of disciplinary practice. At the start of any army career is a long process of training,
meant to tear soldiers down and slowly reform and rebuild them as efficient tools of war.
Soldiers are not just taught how to survive in battle during training. Disciplinary actions, such as
standing in rank or recognizing the chain of command, are implemented to teach soldiers the
proper hierarchy, to form individuals into a unit brought together by their unquestioning
acceptance of commands. Coming out against this order is punished, which reinforces the
process in some or removes others who cannot assimilate altogether (160). Disciplinary systems
shape soldiers to accept an ideological system and make them into the protectors of that system.
Crafting a narrative around the soldier as an epic hero leads to the acceptance of that hero and
their beliefs. Armies are a symbol of authority that protect the ideological forces that birthed
them. To maintain that symbol, institutions are incentivized to cultivate positive images of the
army, which is easily done through identification with soldiers.
An attitude of the epic not only romanticizes societal hardships but also resigns one to
them. Burke points out that the epic hero is always flawed in some way to allow for
identification and resignation in an audience. It is impossible to identify with a perfect being.
Creating visible flaws in a hero makes them realistic and approachable and allows one to better
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identify with the hero. Identification with the hero by way of their flaws invites one to seek these
flaws within themselves, which Burke claims promotes an attitude of resignation (35 ATH). An
epic attitude leads one to dismiss the hardships associated with the symbols of authority that
might be set aside by another and accept these flaws as a part of life regardless of frame. The
epic hero cannot overcome society's downfalls; instead they must become at home in them. One
is brought to accept the symbols of authority because, like the epic hero, that is seemingly the
only valid option presented to them if they hope to succeed in society and be a hero themself.
The sentiment of resignation crafted from the epic hero is one also found by Kuhn when
looking at paradigms in science. When new paradigms emerge in science, they are not
immediately accepted. Paradigms will be accepted or rejected in the realm of science by the
process of probabilistic verification. Although frames alter one’s view of the world they do not
change the world itself, and the problems faced by one paradigm will be faced by the next as
well. Paradigms shift when one paradigm can answer questions the current paradigm is unable to
answer (145). Just as with Fisher and the narrative paradigm, Kuhn’s paradigms are also
accepted based upon serviceability. Kuhn argues that there is no greater metric by which to
accept paradigms in science than probability because no theory can ever be exposed to all
possible relevant tests; yet this attitude is still indicative of the same resignation to symbols of
authority as created by the epic hero (145). Scientists are forced to resign themselves to the faults
of a paradigm in order to work within the structure created by that paradigm to try and correct
those faults. If even in the realm of science, the field where everything is meant to be tested and
proven before acceptance, scientists must resign themselves to the fact that no paradigm will be
perfect and base further research on these imperfect frameworks, then the same process must
exist everywhere in society. The epic hero is essential to society because all frames have flaws,
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and if there is to be any comfort found in society people must have an attitude that resigns them
to these flaws.

5.2. – Tragedy
A tragic attitude, like the epic, is designed to help one resign themselves to their own
limitations. Under a tragic perspective, one is meant to identify with the narrative and through
this identification recognize flaws as their own rather than that of the dominant symbols of
authority. The internalization of fault among people is beneficial to an accepting attitude because
it takes the burden off society. It is not the system that is broken, rather the people within it
(Burke 37 ATH). Burke places the epic and the and tragedy within the frame of acceptance
because they work to draw blame away from the dominant frame and its supporting symbols of
authority. Where the tragedy differs from the epic comes from, what Burke calls, it's more
enlightened form (37 ATH). Within tragedy the forensic is often brought to the forefront. The
forensic genre is an idea originated by Aristotle as one of the three species of rhetoric. Its
elements consist of accusation and defense, and it deals in the past for the subject of these
elements are always things of the past (Aristotle in Brummett 150). Burke expands upon
Aristotle’s idea of the forensic and moves it beyond the judicial realm that Aristotle assigned the
genre to. Burke sees the forensic as the basis for the verbalization and rationalization of
community acts, attitudes and policies. The forensic is a reaction to the interaction of individuals
within a society. Burke specifically looks at the genre as it arises from commerce. As citizens
interact in the marketplace and as causal relationships form new traditions new values arise. The
forensic rises as a response to regulate these interactions (254-255 ATH). This response comes in
the form of the tragedy. Burke finds that the rise of business individualism led to the rise of
personal ambition as a motive for human acts. The reactionary attitude towards this development
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of new values was tragic in base. Among reactionaries defending the prior dominant system
hubris was made into a sin and surrounded by connotations of crime. Burke views tragedy not as
an attitude meant to make one feel sad, but as a complex trial. Narrative is meant to provide an
example of the path of sin, as determined by the accepted frame. A tragic attitude serves to
reinforce the moral codes of the present as it reacts to new societal practices (38 ATH). The
mirroring of the trial within tragedy for the most part is symbolic. Most narratives will not
specifically label a crime, judge, and jury, yet this form assists in the empowerment of the
overall narrative. Burke finds that pure art tends to promote a state of acceptance by placing the
forensic within the realm of art as it is when shaped into an attitude it becomes more acceptable
to its reader (201 PLF). The tragic attitude holds power due to the relationship created by the
reader between reality and the forensic driven by what Dumbrava calls human’s need to
harmonize with the world by fulfilling their destiny as narrative beings (256). Understanding of
the world comes through a narratological framework, and by mimicking this process a message
can become more appealing. The attitude of the tragedy is learned based upon an identification
with a story and its support of the symbols of authority, rather than a blanket statement on the
order of things. Dumbrava writes that narrative as a mode of aesthetic knowledge assimilates and
restores experience in a less obvious and analytical way, but in taking this route becomes more
compatible with the ambiguity of our destiny as narrative beings (259). Pure art enables
resignation by resolving in aesthetic fusion trends not resolvable in the practical sphere. A tragic
attitude provides narratological reasoning for sin and crime in an aesthetic form to maintain the
acceptance of symbols of authority when challenges to their hierarchy and definitions arise.
An example of how a tragic attitude plays out in society can be seen in the way legal
codes are created and interpreted. In the United States laws are curated based upon legal
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precedent, which can be viewed as the narratological retelling of the law. Legal precedent
determines how laws should be carried out in the future, if at all, based upon instances where the
law was unclear and the ruling of the court in those situations. Cases are decided, society is
directly shaped, by how justices interpret the forensic narratives presented to them. The legal
system attempts to define events through a code; yet the legal code itself is formed through the
moral lessons learned from dominant narratives. Laws can be shaped to fit these narratives
because of the forensic nature intrinsic in societal narrative found in its call for adjudication on
good reasons. This, to an extent, is the outlined purpose of the forensic genre. Burke finds the
forensic in the tragic attitude because the tragedy is reflective of the stories presented to society
every day that lead to the determination of criminality. People do not come to accept laws from
their codified version rather from the forensic genre implicit to all societal narratives that lead to
the formation of laws in the first place. This is because it is from the aesthetic representation of
the law that they become moralized. Foucault writes that a true politician will bind his or her
people “by the chain of their own ideas,” and that this chain is made even stronger when the
people believe these ideas to have been of their own formation. A leader or institution in order to
master society and gain their position will sow a chain of ideas in their citizens' minds as this
allows for them to guide society in the direction they wish (102-103). Citizens will support the
laws of their nation, follow their leaders, because the ideas implicit in these laws have already
been accepted through the narratives that come to control idea formation all the way from birth.

5.3. – Comedy
Burke’s final attitude within the frame of acceptance is the comedy. Like tragedy being a
more enlightened form than the epic, Burke finds comedy to be a more civilized form of the
tragedy. He backs this claim by pointing out that only the happiest of classes can produce good
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comedy (39 ATH). For a comedic attitude to arise in the accepted frame those within it must be
truly content with their place. They must have already been brought to resign themselves to what
they have been told are their own limitations via the epic and tragedy. For all this advancement
though, Burke also compares the comedic category to a content village that has evolved its
culture at the edge of a sleeping volcano preparing to break forth and scatter destruction (39
ATH). The destructive forbearing of the comedic frame is based upon the fact that for one class
to rise to peak happiness requires the oppression of the other classes. For the class that has risen
above the others, Burke writes that their interests provide cues that distort the interpretive frame,
leading them to see an apparent totality of the dominant frame over the world when in reality it is
a mere partiality (40 ATH). Those within the dominant class will see their frame as that of all of
society ignoring its failures due to the material gain that comes with adequate representation.
Burke names this phenomenon class morality, and it goes hand in hand with another of his
concepts, cultural lag.
As opposed to class morality, cultural lag is related to the rise of the other classes of
people who are not accurately portrayed by a frame (40 ATH). These groups are culturally
dispossessed and often accused of attitudinizing as a means of discreditation. Their new ideas,
that go against the dominant frame, according to Burke, are often thought of as opinions rather
than facts and thus can be ignored by the beneficiaries of a frame (41 ATH). A Comedic attitude
like a tragic one warns against new attitudes but shifts from pointing out the criminal to the
stupid. People are not vicious rule breakers, but just mistaken in their perspective. Where tragedy
warns against the dangers of hubris by labeling it criminal, comedy labels it as mere stupidity. A
comic attitude delegitimizes new values in an attempt to make subscribers of the new idea appear
as ridiculous and ignorable. Comedy attempts to point out the errors in the attitudes of the
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oppressed classes through dramatic irony (41 ATH). In order to do this, comedy, like tragedy,
must develop a logical forensic causality, as this allows for syllogistic deduction on the part of
the reader. The comedic attitude differs from the tragic in that the logical forensic causality built
up deals with the question of what is humane rather than a tragic attitude which looks at what is
in-humane. This presents a “dramatization of quirks and foibles” that guides one holding a
comedic attitude in support of the symbols of authority on the proper ways to live within the
dominant frame (42 ATH). The attitudinizing nature of the comedic attitude forms many of the
fictitious relationships between classes that helps maintain hegemony.
The comedic attitude allows for the passing over of other opinions due to their presumed
ridiculous nature. One example of Kuhn’s in his description of paradigm shift had to do with the
transition from the belief in the geocentric universe to the heliocentric universe. Kuhn explains
how the shift to the Copernican view of the universe did not happen immediately; instead, it
needed further evidence and proof that it was a more serviceable model then that of the
geocentric universe (150). The burden of proof was so large for the shift to the heliocentric
universe because of how it was framed in society. Interpreters of the bible believed that it clearly
stated that the earth was unmoving, and in multiple sections of the King James Bible passages
can be found that discuss the earth's immobility (First Chronicles 16:30, Psalm 104:5 and
Ecclesiastes 1:5). Many in the religious world responded to Copernicus not by disproving his
findings but by making them out to be ridiculous and calling into question Copernicus’s
character. Martin Luther wrote:
There is talk of a new astrologer who wants to prove that the earth moves and goes
around instead of the sky, the sun, the moon, just as if somebody were moving in a
carriage or ship might hold that he was sitting still and at rest while the earth and the trees
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walked and moved. But that is how things are nowadays: when a man wishes to be clever
he must . . . invent something special, and the way he does it needs to be the best! The
fool wants to turn the whole art of astronomy upside-down. However, as Holy Scripture
tells us, so did Joshua bid the sun to stand still and not the earth (Pogge quoting Luther).
Luther does not discuss the scientific principles at work in Copernichus’s theory, instead just
passes him off as a fool. The devices noted by Burke in the comedic category hold great power
in the societal realm. The ability to reject sound reason on the basis that it does not match current
conceptions allows institutions to maintain power. As Burke notes though, this is a dangerous
path to walk. If sound reason can come to control the narrative surrounding a topic and
overpower the attitudinizing of the opposing institution that institution's position will be severely
weakened. The Volcano will erupt, and the village will be destroyed.
What does this destruction really entail though? Are symbols of authority rejected and
replaced by new ones or are they just extended in a way that opens them up to the left behind
groups by cultural lag? The narratological control granted to institutions by the formation of
community makes it difficult to believe that symbols of authority can ever truly be rejected.
Attitudes of acceptance are extremely powerful and gripping because of all the support networks
in place that maintain them. Forming new ideas is difficult when identity formation is tied to
public memory, which will align with the dominant ideological beliefs of a time. Foucault writes
that people are kept in line not by a central power or a network of forces, but by a network of
diverse elements. These mechanisms might be intended to comfort, but they also all exercise a
power of normalization for dominant ideological beliefs (307-308). The mechanisms discussed
by Foucault are that of the prison system, but he also notes the power of discursive control for
normalization. By the nature of their hegemony dominant groups have gained control over
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societal narratives. The rise of other classes endangers this control, but dominant groups have the
ability and incentive to respond to this danger. These groups will respond in a way that benefits
them the most because of class morality and the pleasure principle. They will attempt to subvert
rejection and extend frames in a way that maintains their dominance and lessens the threat of
rising secondary groups. Burke discusses this practice when he talks about the attitudes that rise
during times of transition.

6. - Transitional Attitudes
Burke studies times of transition to see how frames or paradigms interact and how
attitudes are formed from that interaction. Transitionary periods occur due to pressures placed on
attitudes of acceptance by attitudes of rejection. As pressure is placed on the dominant symbols
of authority, they begin to lose their authoritative value and the frame they exist within loses its
control. When Burke discusses attitudes as existing during times of transition, he is talking about
the attitudes that arise as a frame reaches its breaking point. These attitudes attempt to subvert
the rejection of symbols of authority by extending them to appease the groups holding an attitude
of rejection pushing the frame to its breaking point. Burke calls this breaking point a frame’s
Malthusian Limit. Burke derives his idea of the Malthusian limit from the ideas of Thomas
Malthus on population growth and the world’s limited supply of resources. Burke conceptualizes
that much like Malthus’s belief in the earth’s limited population capacity, and the breaking point
that would come if such capacity was surpassed, frames can face their own breaking points (298
ATH). Unlike Malthus though, the thing that pushes the breaking point of a frame is not
population, but by the products of the bureaucratization of the imagination. Burke describes the
bureaucratization of the imagination as the phenomenon by which imaginative possibilities are

30

shaped when they are embodied in the realities of social texture (Burke 225 ATH). As ideas are
integrated into society aspects of those ideas must be compromised for the idea to gain traction
within the existing societal framework. For new frames to be accepted by others requires them to
be structured in a way that trades imaginative possibility for acceptability by other’s terministic
screens. The existence of the bureaucratization of the imagination is evidence of the institutional
control over narrative and thought. For people to come together they must work within the
discursive restraints of the dominant narratological system. Completely new values can arise, but
in order to challenge pre-existing value systems, they must be morphed to fit within others moral
reading of narrative. Fisher says for a narrative to be considered rational it must fulfill the
demands of narrative probability and fidelity (2). A narrative that presents an entirely new moral
argument will not be viewed as coherent or feasible to individuals who have been pressured their
entire existence to think within the dominant frame. To gain support, to gain narrative rationality,
new ideas must be bureaucratized. This bureaucratization is seen through the shaping of ideas to
incorporate the spiritual factors already in place in the objective and material order of society
determined by symbols of authority (Burke 112 ATH). Burke sees this as taking place when an
imaginative possibility is made to embody “all the complexity of language and habits, in the
property of relationships, the methods of the government, production and distribution, and in the
development of rituals that re-enforce the same emphasis” (225 ATH). Eventually though, this
same process that helped create the support for a frame will lead it to its breaking point due to
the byproducts it creates.
The potential Malthusian limit of a frame is due to the imperfections of the
bureaucratization of the imagination. Burke claims that human beings are not a perfect fit for any
historic texture. This creates a need for compromise to enable group formation. Certain
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emphases will need to be stressed leading to the neglect of others. The unintended byproducts of
the bureaucratic order arise from the neglect of factors made necessary by compromise (225-226
ATH). They exist as the factors neglected by the compromise that allowed certain values to be
engrained in the symbols of authority. New ideas will be forced to shape around old ones and as
a result will eventually face the same problems as the old frame. When these byproducts become
stronger than the original purpose of a frame, a frame will be brought to its breaking point (226
ATH). Burke finds that three key symptoms exist that show a frame is reaching its breaking
point during transitionary periods. As a frame reaches its Malthusian limit, it becomes
endangered of losing its serviceability, the thing that draws support to a frame. To survive a
frame or its supporters will attempt to portray the frame as still serviceable through the
maintenance of the pleasure principle (9, 21 PC). Burke first states that for a time a frame will
be extended to meet the new necessities of what is serviceable by “casuistic stretching” (133
ATH). Casuistic stretching is the introduction of new principles into a frame while remaining
faithful to the old principles of that frame. Any metaphorical expansion is an aspect of casuistic
stretching (230 ATH). Burke finds however that an over subtle or deceptive form of reasoning
for protection, as in casuistic stretching, cannot last and eventually will lead to demoralization
rather than reclamation. People will become disturbed as a frame is stretched too far in order to
answer questions previously problematic to the frame and push away from it. Tied to casuistry,
Burke also discusses how force can be used to maintain a frame once it has reached its breaking
point (134 ATH). Systems of discipline and punishment mentioned by Foucault will be used to
make opposing a frame unpleasant, but even Burke says this is limited, as after a certain point
living within a frame will be even more unpleasant than any punishment involved in rejecting it
(Foucault 158). Finally, Burke notes that as a frame truly reaches its breaking point there will be
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an increased reliance upon whatever resource for prayer a frame can provide. For instance, in the
medieval frame prayer as a tool to subdue rejection came in the form of a threat to force a
recalcitrant beyond the possibility of the salvation promised by the frame (134 ATH). This will
again stall a frame from reaching its breaking point, but in the end the dominant frame will force
its opposers to accept a symbolic atheism. This is the same position that the satiric proposes
those in a frame of rejection must take and will be discussed later. Burke finds that it is once
people are willing to give away the symbolic salvation offered by a frame that it can be
replaced. Burke sees these three practices as evidence that transition is taking place. Kuhn also
investigates characteristics of transition but focuses more on the qualities of new ideas that
support transition rather then symptoms that arise in an attempt to subvert it.
Kuhn studies the history of science in order to provide specific examples of what causes
paradigm shifts. He states that the transfer of allegiances from one paradigm to another cannot be
forced but rather must be a conversion experience (151). Calls for conversion will arise from
investigations that lead the scientific profession to a new set of commitments that will begin
when the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of
scientific practice (Kuhn 6). What ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in science is when one
paradigm provides answers for specific questions that were impossible to answer within the old
frame. Necessary to build this metric of correctness is the act of falsification (146). Kuhn
describes falsification as the creation of a criterion of improbability, which states the number of
problems solved by each paradigm (147-148). Falsification is a test where a negative outcome
calls for the rejection of an established theory (Kuhn on Popper 146). Falsification converts
because it is directly attempting to prove a frame is inaccurate, yet the process is not always
straightforward. Kuhn warns that if any failure is grounds for rejection, then all theories would
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be rejected (146). Building a hard criterion for the acceptance of something helps to assuage this
problem, yet the grey area still exists. The metric by which new frames are measured is
problematic because it is extremely hard to justify proof when individuals see the world in very
different ways (150). There is no way to overcome this struggle, but Kuhn does point to certain
actions that make falsification more effective. He claims that when a new paradigm can be
legitimately shown to solve a problem that led another into crises it leads more people to shift
allegiance (153).
Kuhn also discusses the idea of simplicity as another method for paradigm shift. Kuhn
argues that new paradigms are not formed already answering the questions that have led the
previous frames to crises. Frames require people to flesh them out to accept the byproducts
unacceptable within the old frame. If new paradigms were solely judged upon problem solving,
then there would never be anyone to actually discover a frame's problem-solving capabilities.
Kuhn finds that it is a frame’s appeal to people's aesthetic motives by appearing to provide a
simpler or neater picture of the world that initially attracts original converts to a frame (Kuhn
157). Why the aesthetic holds this power over us is most likely due to what Burke sees as the
intermingling of our aesthetic values with our ethical values. He finds that the most practical of
revolutions are generally found to have first manifested in an aesthetic sphere mirroring what
Kuhn sees in the scientific realm (201 PLF). Burke concludes that things seen as ethical are
often connected to what is viewed as aesthetic. An appeal to aesthetics then can be understood as
an appeal to morals, and as the ethical value of a frame begins to fracture around its breaking
point, one can begin to see why a new frame might seem more aesthetic to some and allow for
initial conversion.
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6.1. – Grotesque
Burke’s attitudes that relate to times of transition stem from the characteristics laid out by
he and Kuhn regarding the switching over from one frame to the next. The first transitionary
attitude identified by Burke is the grotesque (Burke 57 ATH). A grotesque attitude focuses on
mysticism, which in this use refers to a submission to a higher power as the provider of ideology
(Burke 58 ATH). Burke attaches mysticism to transitionary periods because he finds that
throughout history mysticism as a collective movement has come about mainly in times of severe
confusion of the cultural frame. To become popular mysticism requires a mass shift in people’s
allegiance to symbols of authority, which occurs as a dominant frame reaches its breaking point
(Burke 58 ATH). A mystic attitude seeks to propel the subjective elements of imagery within the
forensic pattern meant to support a frame above the objective or public elements. One example
of this process at work can be seen in the reaction of devout American Christians to climate
change. The climate change narrative is one supported by the scientific world. Scientists claim
that their models prove global warming's presence to the greatest of their ability, and effects of
climate change can already be seen today. Even with all the scientific support though, a large
group of people still doubt that climate change exists and is a man-made phenomenon. A 2014
study by the Public Religion Research Institute revealed that almost half of all Americans
attributed the severity of recent natural disasters to Biblical end times, and among white
evangelicals, that number jumped to 77 percent (Jones et al). This response to climate change
does not seek to disprove its existence, rather it looks to take agency away from people. Climate
change is part of God's plan and therefore should be accepted as natural. God gifted the earth and
its resources to man, and it is man's birthright to use these resources. The grotesque attitude
taken up by climate change deniers propels the subjective imagery of a frame over threatening
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objective material. It allows for the acceptance of climate change, while at the same time calling
for no change of behavior or lifestyle for people. Mysticism as a practice stretches a frame to
cover barriers once faced by it. It opens the possibility of acceptance of the symbols of authority
by removing agency from a situation. In placing the subjective above the objective, a grotesque
attitude allows for a world to be built that favors belief rather than fact.
The grotesque manages to portray the relative nature of systems through its presentation
of incongruity. Burke names the grotesque as the cult of incongruity minus the laughter. He
emphasizes the lack of laughter to show how the grotesque diverges in its use of incongruity
from humor. Humor, like the grotesque, is rife with incongruities, but unlike the grotesque, it
attempts to reassure by minimizing the magnitude of obstacles. The scaling down of threats in
this manner provides relief through laughter. (Burke 58-59 ATH). By losing this laughter,
grotesque leads one to approach incongruity in a serious manner. This guides one to see past
forensic structures that creates the sense of incongruity to its symbolic interpretive basis (Burke
60 ATH). The grotesque depending upon the situation can have varying effects regarding
acceptance and rejection yet will ultimately lead one to a certain passivity towards symbols of
authority. Burke studies these effects by looking at mysticism’s relationship with monasticism
and gang morality.
Burke believes that the monastic lifestyle exists solely in the transitional, and as such is an
excellent case study to look at how these transitional times affect communal organization. He
finds that monastic orders, assuming they have not been corrupted by business interests, recruit
their initiates at a point of crises, and then work to institutionalize the mentality prevailing at that
point (69-70 ATH). Monasteries exist in such a form as to promote a sense of mysticism or
spirituality amongst their members. This maintains the frame of acceptance even at this point of
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crises. Existing in a permanent state of transition suspends the monastery and its members
between heaven and earth, remaining in the subjective state that exists in transition (70 ATH).
From monastic tradition the power of a grotesque attitude to organize and maintain a public
order is seen. Those within the monastic life, by being recruited at a point of transition, open
themselves to the symbolic redefinition perpetuated by a grotesque attitude. This works
maintains the strict order of monastic life without the fear that its members might question it.
The grotesque in this form then becomes what Burke calls a “passive frame of acceptance”
useful for maintaining order. Burke also finds that this passive frame of acceptance can grow
from the concept of gang morality, just in a very different way.
Burke believes there is a sense of guilt associated with existing between two worlds.
People are driven to exist in a certain frame because doing otherwise would make them feel
uncomfortable in society or left out of it. The monastic seeks to assuage the sense of guilt felt by
a ritual of contrition; yet, that guilt can also be approached by the explicit rejection of contrition.
Burke notes this explicit rejection as it exists within “gang morality” (72 ATH). He states that a
gang morality arises when the orthodox values are no longer enough to handle a situation leading
to the dispossession of individuals. The dispossession portrays itself within an individual as
negativism, which will lead the individual to reject everything in rejecting a little. Essentially the
rejection of anything will become the rejection of everything. Individuals existing in a state of
rejection like this will overcome their guilt by forming bands of their own ideas, or a new frame
of rejection (73 ATH). Like the monastic then, gang morality ends with some organization, but
where the monastic creates a material organization starting at a point of spirituality, gang
morality leads to a spiritual one starting at a point of materiality. It is spiritual in that the ideas of
the organization confront an imperfect world with the ideas of a better one, ideas that are
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idealistic rather than realistic. 74 ATH). The idea of class morality, discussed earlier, shares this
approach, which is why Burke thinks of gang morality as a “dignified variant of the same
process” (73 ATH). Gang Morality allows for the confrontation of the imperfect world with the
idea of a future better one, yet this still creates an attitude of passivity to the frame of acceptance.
Confronting today’s problems with the idea that a new brighter future is imminent leads one to
remain within a frame of acceptance. One will choose to remain because the maintenance of
existence within the problemed frame is what will lead to a brighter future. In creating the belief
that a frame brings about its own destruction one is incentivized to remain in the frame they
might vehemently reject. Marxist thought is an example of this. Marx preaches that the
capitalistic system will create its own downfall through its oppression and concurrent expansion
of the proletariat class (19-21). Even though Marx is ultimately calling for the rejection of
capitalism he is maintaining that capitalism must run its course for it to fall. Although it might
seem counterintuitive what Marx is actually calling for is a passivity to the dominant symbols of
authority. By believing that symbols of authority will bring about their own destruction one will
come to maintain their existence within the system. They will not necessarily adopt an attitude of
acceptance towards the symbols of authority but neither will they adopt and attitude of rejection.

6.2. – Didactic
Burke’s second transitional attitude is related to the didactic, or what might commonly be
referred to as propaganda. The didactic differs from the grotesque because where the grotesque
makes for passivity in the frame of acceptance, the didactic makes for activity (75 ATH). Burke
finds that in the unfolding of history the imaginative expression of a trend precedes its
conceptual critical counterpart, i.e. art will be the first representation of new ideas (201 PLF).
The didactic seeks to reverse this process though in forming the imaginative in obedience to
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critical postulates (75 ATH). Burke notes this motive as it plays out in democratic versus
totalitarian regimes. He finds that democracies leadership by impermanent delegates and party
systems leads to the use of debunking devices such as propaganda to slander dominant symbolic
definition. This practice takes away the possibility for integrative impulses in people to assign a
hero. The inability to produce a central figure of power protects democratic regimes from a threat
of totalitarianism. Parliamentary or democratic systems release modes of thought, via the
didactic, that seeks to protect its citizens by cutting off their possibility of creating a “heroic
fountain-head” (77-78 ATH). Totalitarian regimes on the other hand do the exact opposite. Their
use of propaganda provides their populations with opportunities for the mythification of their
leaders, but in doing so prevents criticism and the possibility of rejection (78 ATH). This regime
instead of being based upon and morphed by the imagination of the populous uses their systems
to produce art in order to sway the populous to their side. Burke writes that a didactic attitude
seeks to avoid the confusions of synthesis, or the bureaucratization of the imagination, by
labeling people within the binary of friend or foe. This system as with most systems based upon
binaries leads to oversimplification and can be looked at by its opposition as a sentimentality
over anything else (79 ATH). Burke labels sentimentality as the weak side of didacticism and
that in such a light it becomes an “act of will” (79 ATH). When one looks into societal trends,
they will come across good trends and bad ones, where all the good are balanced by the bad and
vice versa. A sentimental attitude serves as an act of will in that it leads people to label the good
as what is true. Such acts lead to a transcendence of the original classification of a frame as good
and bad by keeping only what is true, the good. The didactic internalizes this approach in order
to maintain traditional symbols of authority within transitional periods when they are reaching
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their Malthusian limit. An attitude of the didactic develops a trust within an institution even
when objective surface level facts might make their actions out to be negative.
The development of a didactic attitude within its members is an active way institutions
can maintain a hold over symbolic definition. Research on public memory shows how this
process is internalized in the behavior of institutions. Identities exist by virtue of memories and
memories by virtue of society (Reyes 226). Symbols are mobilized to shape the past into an
authoritative narrative that renders public memory as something explicitly persuasive (227).
Institutions define symbols of authority by crafting public memory. Retelling history in their own
words allows dominant groups to control identity formation and the moral lessons from these
events. Take for instance the way in which the United States has decided to educate students on
the Vietnam War. William Griffen and John Marciano study the Vietnam war and the current
constructed narrative around the conflict. They relate the Pentagon Papers, a set of government
documents that gave insight into the decision making during the war, to the narrative of the war
crafted in secondary education history textbooks. They argue that textbooks offer an obvious
means of realizing hegemony in education and that they establish parameters for students that
define what is legitimate, reasonable, practical, true and beautiful (163). This means that the
omission of crucial facts or views greatly limits the ways in which students come to view
historical events (163). Griffen and Marciano find that the wide ideological range of textbooks
they studied “rationalized and affirmed the official US view, rarely placing the assembled facts
in the context of a reasoned and rigorous examination” (167). They argue that these texts have
failed to examine the fundamental nature of the war and the social, economic and political
contradictions that brought it about (165). Griffen and Marciano conclude by saying that the
government presents a singular narrative about the Vietnam war because they are aware that a
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critically informed understanding of the Vietnam war will undermine their hegemonic
domination (169). The crafting of the Vietnam war by the US shows how public memory can be
shaped to affect value systems and by an extension identity. Narratives are selected based upon
their good reasons (Fisher 2). The US shapes the memory of Vietnam in order to dictate the
moral lessons gained from the war. At least in schoolbooks, Vietnam is remembered as a battle
between democracy and communism. In its retelling the US government incorporates symbols of
authority, specifically the good versus evil nature in the battle over communism, to cement their
power. Altering history to support messaging allows institutions to maintain the moral
positioning posited by their connected symbols of authority as well as strengthen their definition
of those symbols as it attempts to wipe out counter narratives that argue for other good morals.
Griffen and Marciano end their discussion of textbooks' role in swaying education by
describing how these textbooks help schools perform one of their largest social functions. They
believe that the most basic function of schools is to obtain an uncritical acceptance of present
society (164). This perspective stands contrary to what might be the popular belief of the public
in regard to school’s purpose, yet Griffen and Marciano believe that the influence granted to the
dominant class over learning is intrinsic to the idea of hegemony, the “influence that dominant
classes or groups exercise by virtue of their control of ideological institutions’” (163). Burke
recognizes the power institutions exert over the populace and its role in stretching a frame, but
still believes at some point a frame can reach its breaking point and a frame of rejection can take
over. That being said it becomes difficult to believe that the rejection of a frame can ever come
about and not just a casuistic stretching due the control granted to the dominant class by the
nature of their hegemony.
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Schools are not the only place the acceptance of an ideology is taught; dominant
ideologies are reinforced in the everyday practices of life. In the current capitalistic system one
method of control has come to dominate society. Monetary symbolism touches every aspect of
daily routines in today’s society and has made a true rejection of the current frame very difficult.
Burke describes that under the neo-Malthusian principle one could assume that the enactment of
financial policy as called for by a casuistic stretching of the current frame would eventually lead
to inflation rates that would destroy the basis of money (162 ATH). Burke backs this claim with
traditional economic theory but notes that the true nature of monetary symbolism will alter this
effect. He finds that the huge network of debt that has been created from the global economy has
led money to not be backed by a material but by a social function. Money has come to be a
“symbolic superstructure” that defines societal interactions from the individual to global level.
Economists who study the symbolic nature of monetary systems do not clarify these processes
but serve to mystify them (162-163 ATH). Economic processes are presented as natural effects
rising from simple supply and demand principles. In reality though these effects are the result of
the system they were bred from not part of the natural order. Monetary symbolism has been
manipulated to form the idea that an invisible hand controls market forces. Society has been
shaped around the flow of supply and demand making the process appear natural within the
current system when its placement is really the result of ideological leanings. Capitalistic ideas,
the influence of money has not remained purely in the economic realm but has spread into the
grammar of thought that influences how everything is understood. The grammar of thought is
how symbols are used and understood in line with the ideological leanings of a time. Today
discourse is shaped around the influence of monetary symbolism. Even ideas that reject the idea
of private property still are based in a grammar of thought centered around monetary symbolism.
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Lakoff and Johnson talk about conceptual metaphors as symbols that assist in the understanding
of other concepts or ideas in terms of that symbol. They write that “the most fundamental values
in a culture will be coherent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts in
culture” (22). Ideas of money have changed dramatically during the curvature of history, but as
long as there has been civilization there has been some metric of value associated with goods.
These value metrics from their origin have stood as conceptual metaphors that have shaped
culture and the understanding of the world. Their position has shaped dialogue and restricted
new ideas to fit within the realm of monetary symbolism. One example of this can be seen in the
study of environmentalism. In order to translate to the community at large the implication of
environmental issues such as climate change, the damage caused by them oftentimes must be put
in terms of a dollar value. It is difficult for many who are not well versed in the subject to
understand the implications of these events without the assignment of a monetary marker. An
entire field of study, environmental economics, works to assign value to the environment to help
promote sustainable practices. Ideas of money are so concrete in society that to understand the
consequences of things such as environmental issues they must be put in terms of dollars. Reyes
writes that when discursive subjugation is taken up and enacted it ceases to be seen as socially
constructed (228). Money has become a simple fact of society. Although a creation of social
construction monetary symbolism is now an innate part of the social system. The concept of
money cannot be rejected in a frame if that frame seeks to become dominant. A casuistic
stretching might take place to limit the influence of money to the extent that it is not
recognizable as it is today, but the concept of money is so ingrained in peoples way of life that a
new frame cannot arise that will outright reject it. Monetary symbolism is just one instance of
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this control, symbol systems are rife with conceptual metaphors that support a frame of
acceptance and make it extremely difficult to truly think outside the dominant frame.

7. - Attitudes of Rejection
One of the major points made by Burke in his discussion of the transitional is that there is
a limit to how much casuistic stretching a frame can take before it breaks. Burke supports this
claim by looking at the large-scale shifts that have taken place in society. These shifts did not
just happen instantaneously though, and even Burke recognizes how the casuistic stretching of a
previous frame made room for the appearance of the new one (229 ATH). What is the breaking
point though? When do altered value systems go from being the result of the casuistic stretching
of a frame to that of a new frame? Burke looks at the monastic order as constantly existing in a
state of transition (70 ATH). Society also exists in a constant state of transition. New ideas are
constantly being created, and their interaction with different attitudes constantly shifts how one
feels about symbols of authority. This constant stream of new ideas though, does not lead to a
continuous stream of new frames and symbols of authority. Instead they extend symbols of
authority to cover those new ideas once they gain enough popularity. For those new ideas to gain
support they must first traverse the narratological landscape controlled by the dominant class.
Ideas must be bureaucratized and lose their imaginative possibilities or their true state of
rejection if they are to gain support. They must be placed in the language of the dominant class
for others to see their narrative rationality and accept their moral arguments and attitude towards
the symbols of authority. Ideas must also be made identifiable by relating to concepts already
attached to public memory (Reyes 226). These restrictions placed on new ideas due to the
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hegemonic control of narrative makes the rejection of a frame impossible under normal
circumstances. Burke outlines different frames in history because he takes a wide-lens view
when looking at frames. If that lens is brought down though to look at the daily interaction of
attitudes within frames, it becomes much harder to separate frames. It is hard to separate frames
because these frames are not ever actually rejected. The attitudes of the grotesque and didactic
constantly reshape how symbols of authority are perceived in order to perpetually stretch them
and maintain a frame. There is no limit to casuistic stretching. What Burke notes as the limit is
just the point where the stretching of a frame has made it unrecognizable. Burke sees this as a
shift because of the macro approach he takes to the study, but in actuality it is a long fluid
process that brings about this change. The change is based upon the old frame and as such it
should not be viewed as a rejection but a continuation. Burke’s limit on the power of force to
maintain a frame also comes across as shortsighted and unaligned with the ideas of Foucault.
Foucault outlines the role played by disciplinary practices in forming and maintaining ideology.
He underlines how deeply engrained and necessary these practices are for society to exist as it
does (158). Following Foucault, it can be reasoned that like casuistic stretching there is no limit
to the influence of force. Although at a point living within the restrictions of certain symbols of
authority will become more unpleasant than the discipline faced by its rejection a hierarchy
formed around practices of discipline and punishment will remain. The ideas that bring about
rejection will be born out of a disciplinary system and will be implemented through one. Ideas
will be bureaucratized to fit within disciplinary systems, so they to can be engrained in society.
These disciplinary systems exist as one of the spiritual factors new ideas must be founded upon
to spread. Practices of force are not limited because they are necessary for new ideas to become
an ideology. Disciplinary systems support the casuistic stretching of symbols of authority by

45

incorporating the altered values of these symbols into the everyday practices of individuals. They
deny the possibility of rejection because new ideas must still fit within the system to become a
part of society, and true rejection would just destroy the system. In the world of science, it makes
sense to label a new paradigm as the rejection of the old. When new scientific discoveries come
about it can reshape how everything is thought about as Kuhn shares. In the real world though, it
is impossible, due to all the many reasons discussed, for a new idea to completely reshape how
society is processed. New ideas are limited and must be based upon what came before. Unlike in
the world of science, there is not going to be some huge discovery backed by an established
method that is going to come about and change everything unless aliens invade, or the
coronavirus wipes out civilization. There are too many structures in place for a rejection to
happen in society as it might in the world of science. What Burke notes as attitudes of rejection
are not actually forces of rejection, rather they are the attitudes of secondary classes that seek to
expand a frame and symbols of authority to cover their needs. Attitudes of rejection actually seek
to bring about transitional attitudes in order caustically stretch a frame because the hegemonic
domination of narrative makes true rejection impossible.

7.1. – Elegy
The first attitude Burke discusses as one of rejection is the attitude shown within the
elegy or plaint, which can be understood as literature rhetorically related to complaint. On the
individual level, the attitude of the elegiac is of a paradoxical nature. Burke finds that once a man
has perfected a technique of complaint, he can be more at home with sorrow than possible
without it. Complaint to the individual is a tool used like the epic or tragedy to come to terms
with the world’s faults. Burke explains that people beholden to an attitude of complaint will find
that the integrity of their character is best upheld by situations from which they can complain. On
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the individual level, complaining is a therapeutic practice. In a restaurant people complain to
waiters when there is a problem with the service or food. In their complaint the patrons are not
expecting change to arise from their words. Complaint just makes those individuals feel better
about the supposed atrocity committed because they at least said something about it. The attitude
of complaint on a per person basis maintains symbols of authority. The therapeutic nature of
complaint leads individuals to want to maintain what brought up the complaint and as such
presents itself more as an attitude of acceptance (44 ATH). Where the elegiac attitude transcends
the realm of acceptance into what Burke calls a frame of rejection comes with the organization of
the attitude.
Burke finds that if organized as a collective movement, a class will arise to “move in on”
the complaint. This complaint will be expounded upon providing more and more points for
complaint until the physical limits of the previous attitude are reached and it is replaced (44
ATH). Burke relates the elegy to humor because they both cause the improper estimation of a
situation. Like humor, an organized attitude of complaint causes one to inaccurately size up their
own resources. The elegy separates itself from humor in that the real disproportion of the
situation is spread between the weakness of the self and the magnitude of the situation (44 ATH).
The apparent inaccuracy of the plaint leads Burke to describe it as homeopathic, and through this
connection it becomes clear as to how complaint serves the frame of rejection. An attitude of
complaint is homeopathic as it seeks to develop a tolerance to possibilities of misfortune by
accustoming one to misfortune in small doses. On an individual scale this represents itself in a
therapeutic way. Brought up to a larger scale though a call to action will arise out of the
confidence built up around the normalization of an enemy. A homoeopathic style is based upon
the idea that danger cannot be handled head on but must be accommodated. The elegy serves to
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prepare one for dangerous times by accepting the existence of these times prior to their arrival
(44-47 footnote ATH). To see the power of organized complaint in sparking an attitude of
rejection one needs look no further than the current president of the US, Donald Trump. Trump
has grown infamous for his attacks on the “liberal media” as a source of “Fake News”. Trump
attacks the media in this form to prepare his audience to face the anti-Trump rhetoric perpetuated
by the liberal media. Brett Stephens argues that the president is trying to depose so-called
mainstream media in favor of the media he likes (108). In order to do this though he must instill
in his audience a fear of the factual reporting done by mainstream news agencies. Trump's
homeopathic form of organized complaint prepares his audience to face down the media by
bringing into question what a fact is. Stephens claims that Trump's objection to the liberal media
is not that there’s a liberal bias that gets in the way of its objectivity, but to objectivity itself
(108). Trump prepares his audience to question the nature of factuality. He does this so he can
make claims that are not factually supported but still accepted. The attitude of complaint among
Trump and his audience has allowed them to overcome a great danger to his presidency, facts.
This is something that could not be faced head on, but by preparing his audience, by
accommodating them to the idea of fake news, Trump's word has become all that matters to his
followers. Trump has been able to convince people that he has won the popular vote, that he has
had the largest inauguration ever, and many other things that can be factually disproven because
he homeopathically prepared his audience to question the media (Stephens 108). He has been
able to instill an attitude of rejection in his audience that calls into question the traditional
symbols of authority associated with the media and stabilize his in-group. Although this attitude
rejects the liberal media it does not actually bring about framal rejection of the symbols of
authority as Burke might argue. Trump in his actions is rejecting the liberal media, but not the
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role they play. What Trump is doing is attempting to capture the symbols of authority held by the
media for his own benefit. As stated by Stephens he is attempting to depose the mainstream
media for sources that support him. This is not a rejection, rather an evolution for his and his
base’s benefit. Trump is repurposing symbols of authority to support his ideology, not rejecting
them. Through an elegiac attitude he is attempting to alter public memory to gain control over
identity formation. Reyes discusses this process as a form of control, and that is how Trump is
using it (227). Instead of leading to organized rejection, Trump’s dissemination of an attitude of
complaint is seeking to strengthen symbols of authority and their control over society, just in a
way that benefits him the most. The plaint as seen through this example is not an attitude that
brings about rejection, just a forced change in who controls symbols of authority. The symbols
are maintained, just shifted to support an altered value system.
Within the plaint Burke also points out a pastoral element, as might have come across in
the figure of Trump and his interactions with his base seen in the previous example. The heroic
device of the elegy operates in the sympathetic treatment of humble people, as it often places the
lowly as the bearers of true nobility (48 ATH). The elegy looks to serve those most abandoned
by the frame of acceptance by placing them within this heroic lens. An attitude of complaint
searches to disrupt the order of the dominant frame by empowering the oppressed and organizing
them in a way to be prepared for the dangers, such as punishment, that come from questioning
those in power. The pastoral aspect present within an elegiac attitude assists in the redefinition of
piety, further empowering a state of rejection. For Burke piety is related to ones yearning to
conform with the sources of their being (69 PC). By this definition piety is not confined to
religion; it is instead connected to patterns of judgement developed in childhood, which might
include but is not limited to religion. As one matures, they will revise and amplify these
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childhood patterns, so they can be conformed to new experiences. Although these beliefs change
over time they will never truly be let go (71 PC). This indoctrination, often into the systems of
parental figures, is how one's own system of beliefs is molded (74 PC). Outlook is unconsciously
trained into a person starting at their birth and built up throughout their lives. Outlook determines
how one encodes and decodes information and as a result what definition of morals will be
accepted. It’s effect over moral decisions restricts people to the frame of the class they are
adopted into (75 PC). The pastoral elements present within an organized attitude of complaint
could be viewed as a means of making those holding an attitude of rejection comfortable with the
innate impious nature of rejection, as will be discussed more when talking about the satiric
attitude. An elegiac attitude seeks to redefine what is pious so that the rejection of the traditional
and dominant views of piety becomes not a true rejection of taught ideals. The desire of the
rejected frame can instead be seen as an expansion of ideals to cover those left behind by a frame
of acceptance, those people the elegy places as the bearers of true nobility. An attitude of
complaint makes its subscribers believe themselves to be crusaders rather than heretics. It serves
as a way of maintaining the ideas of piety indoctrinated in one since birth but expands those
ideas so they come to exist within a state of rejection rather than acceptance. This allows the
differing perspective of the secondary group seeking to alter symbols of authority to appear as
more acceptable to those holding an attitude of acceptance. It allows for support of these new
ideas to grow so that a frame will be pushed to its Malthusian limit and be forced to casuistically
stretch. The elegiac attitude does not actually reject symbols of authority as Burke argues. It
instead seeks to expand them to a more acceptable form. From Burke's description of the satirical
attitude a better understanding of the impious nature of rejection can be understood, and more
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discussion can be had as to if these attitudes really exist in a frame of rejection or a secondary
frame looking to expand what is accepted within a frame.

7.2. – Satire
Burke describes the satirist as someone who attacks in others the weaknesses and
temptations that are really within himself (49 ATH). Burke claims that pointing out the innate
faults within a frame even as they exist within oneself is an active rejection of that frame. Instead
of internalizing those faults as an attitude related to the epic or tragedy might lead one to do, a
satirical attitude relates those faults back to the frame itself. Satire as a means of bringing about
rejection has in recent times become very visible. Some of the most successful shows in
countering the rhetoric of Trump have approached the topic with a satiric attitude. Shows like the
Daily Show or Last Week Tonight use satire to point out what they perceive as the ridiculous
nature of many of Trump's policies. Satire has shown itself in this way to be very effective at
uncovering the systematic issues that led to Trump in the first place. It allows for a more critical
conversation of Trump’s rhetoric without the usual fear associated with rejection.
In examining the satirical as an attitude of rejection, Burke looks specifically at the
symbolic parricide involved in the rejection of symbols of authority. In society, the authorities by
defining God or some similar premise make themselves out to be the owner of God, and as such
a rejection of societal authority simulates atheism. Burke claims that atheism requires the denial
of immortality, and implies that if one denies life after death, one can face death with some
variant of defiance (51 footnote ATH). Satire awakens one to true consequences, without a fear
of hell one becomes far more likely to question the church. Hell is just one example of a fearbased tactic used by powerful institutions to maintain their control, but ideas of the same form
with the same purpose exist throughout society. These ideas often present themselves in the form
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of punishment. According to Foucault, when the dominant class takes power, they will put in
place a system of discipline. Society, Foucault argues, is founded upon disciplinary systems, and
these systems are maintained through practices of punishment (158). As a dominant class
cements their position in society, they will put in place structures in order to maintain systems of
authority, such as the idea of criminality set up by legal codes. The prison system as used by
governments today parallels the Church's use of hell to keep order among its followers. There is
a perception that only guilty people go to prison, yet the idea of what guilt is in the first place is
determined within a frame of acceptance. Prison is hung over people who speak out against the
order of things as the punishment for their actions and makes them fearful of following such a
course of action. Punishment maintains the frame of acceptance through its relationship with the
pleasure principle. Behavior changes after repeat punishment acts upon one's original attitude
because punishment makes the experience unpleasant (23 ATH). The systems of authority put in
place by the dominant class work to make the following of the frame of acceptance the only
option for all classes within a society. As mentioned by Foucault the prison system is not just a
tool of punishment, but also one of reformation to the frame of acceptance. The prison system is
built to create docile bodies like that of the training that takes place for military recruits. For one
to be released from prison and re-enter society they must have condemned their previous actions
and be willing to now work within the defined system (294). A satirical attitude allows one to
rise past the fear of prison by understanding its true ideological purpose. Prison is a place to
house the guilty, but one is not made guilty by being in prison. The fear of prison time although
still a very real possibility is lost in the satiric attitude because the faults within the system can be
realized.
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Satire primes people to see the underpinnings of a frame and realize that its faults are
fixable, and not just something to be resigned to. It allows people to see past the fear tactics and
rhetoric of control implemented by dominant societal bodies and opens up possibilities for the
rejection of their definition for symbols of authority. Burke in his writing on satire uses a quote
from Jonathon Swift: “everything spiritual and valuable has a gross and revolting parody”
(Burke quoting Swift 52 ATH). A satirical attitude combats the frames of acceptance because it
makes clear the gross and revolting parody behind it and provides a new moral reasoning and the
agency to seek change. Like the elegy the satire works to redefine one’s yearning to conform
with the sources of their being or their pious beliefs. Within the satiric attitude rejection is no
longer made to be impious. Instead the bodies of control that attempt to define what is pious is of
a heretical nature. Satire shows how these bodies do not actually act in relation to what one
views as pious and opens these organizations up to questioning.
Burkes discussion of the satirical attitude validates its role as a means of questioning and
pushing frames, but that alone is not enough to claim its existence in a frame of rejection. A
satiric lens does not disavow piety completely; it just challenges the systems behind it. A satiric
attitude does not exist in a frame of acceptance, but it does not promote the complete rejection of
that frame’s symbols of authority either. A satiric attitude, like the elegiac, seeks to expand
symbols of authority in order to correct for the faults associated with them. How the attitude
interacts with ideas of piety shows that there is still some continuation of the frame of acceptance
within a satiric attitude. What is considered pious does not necessarily change when one's
attitudes are satirical in nature; all that changes is one's view of the systems behind the current
definition of piety. As Burke himself states ideas of piety are adopted from birth and change over
time to accept new information but never are let go (71 PC). Satire does not magically allow one
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to let go of these ideas, as would be necessary for true rejection. A satiric attitude instead is just a
change in one's view of what is pious for them to come to accept symbols of authority. Viewed
as such the question again arises of whether a satiric attitude like the elegiac is not one of
rejection but of transition, seeking to expand a frame once it has reached its breaking point rather
than completely replacing it. Satire awakens ones to the faults of the dominant frame, so that
they can be fixed. The fixing of a frame though is not a rejection, but much more in line with
Burke’s idea of a casuistic stretching. Satire cannot bring about true rejection because satire
attacks in others the weaknesses and temptations that are also within the attacker. This is the
result of the bureaucratization of the imagination. New values must be morphed to fit within
others' perspectives. As a result, the ideas supported by a satiric attitude will hold many of the
same problems within the dominant frame it is questioning. An extension of this frame to face
those problems does not erase these problems altogether just makes them more acceptable. A
satiric attitude forces those in power to relinquish some power and reorganize symbols of
authority but does not destroy them altogether. Expanding symbols of authority to make them
acceptable to those holding this attitude actually helps in the continuation of a frame. Classes left
behind might gain some power, but other classes will arise who will still be left out by this new
system of values. In the end a satiric attitude will lead to a continuation of a frame, just in an
altered form. As with the two previous attitudes Burke places within the frame of rejection the
final attitude Burke discusses within this frame, that represented in the burlesque genre, also begs
the question of whether it inhibits actual rejection of a frame and symbols of authority.

7.3. – Burlesque
The burlesque can be understood as style that mocks a subject via an absurd
representation such as in a polemic or caricature. Unlike a satiric attitude, an attitude of
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burlesque allows one with that attitude to remain dissociated with the subject. The burlesque
does not attempt to get inside the psyche of that which it attacks, rather it selects external
behaviors and drives them to their logical conclusion. Burke calls this action a “reduction to
absurdity” (53-54 ATH). By avoiding the intimate description of the opposing force, the
burlesque avoids the risk of opening up one's own beliefs to their own argument, as is implicit in
satire. Although the burlesque avoids this one pitfall, in doing so it loses some of its efficacy as
an attitude that brings about the rejection of symbols of authority. Burke calls the burlesque an
occasional dish not a piece de resistance (54 ATH). Caricature lacks a well-rounded frame itself.
It is partisan, which requires it to only be used for the ends of wisdom insofar as ways of making
allowances for it are provided (55 ATH). The burlesque is held down by its connection to one's
own frame, because its reliance upon external descriptions. The burlesque as an attitude in
society will lead to rejection according to Burke, but by itself does not provide the moral
reasoning for why this rejection needs to take place. The burlesque just attacks the symbols of
authority within the frame of acceptance, but the biases behind those attacks unless supported by
good reasons found in other attitudes of rejection can overshadow any actual complaint. The
burlesque is a heartless poetic, it turns every perhaps into a positively and suppresses mitigating
circumstances. As much as it can be useful for pointing out the flaws of a frame, these features
also make it very dangerous as a mode for the creation of new morals (55 ATH). To overcome
this Burke says, “we must not be merely equal to it, we must be enough greater than it to be able
to discount what it says” (55 ATH). The burlesque cannot stand alone to support a frame of
rejection only in addition to the attitudes of the plaint and satire can it find a good use.
Burke discusses in detail how an attitude of burlesque attacks symbols of authority, but
again this by itself does not place the burlesque in a frame of rejection. The burlesque by itself is
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an attitude that mocks the status quo, but it only dictates certain change as it relates to attitudes
of complaint and satire. The burlesque seeks change; it points out the flaws in a frame, but it
does not actually reject the symbols of authority within a frame. Like the elegiac and satirical
attitude that of the burlesque points out the weaknesses in a frame to bring about transitional
attitudes that will lead to its expansion. The burlesque seeks to gain popular support of a
perspective that sees the faults in the positioning of the dominant symbols of authority. This, as
with the attitudes of the elegy and satire, bring about a frame's Malthusian limit. It brings about
the need to caustically stretch these symbols of authority to cover those lost by cultural lag but
does not seek to overturn them. Those in power will be forced to open their ranks and relinquish
some control, but once this is done those who hold what Burke calls and attitude of rejection will
be appeased. The dominant frame will be altered, but not rejected.

8. – Debunking
To answer the question of whether Burke's attitudes of rejection really are based in
rejection, it is important to look at an idea prevalent in each of the attitudes, debunking. Burke
writes that debunking is the “systematic ‘let down’ that matches a systematic ‘build up’” (145
PLF). He is implying that for any attitude of acceptance there will be an attitude of rejection
seeking to deflate it. Debunking could also be understood as the same principle that creates
cultural lag out of class morality. The rise of one class will always lead to the creation of
opposing classes. Burke in his discussion of debunking finds many characteristics prevalent in its
practice. He notes that in the act of questioning or debunking an institution there is an innate
satirism. He writes that a typical debunker will take a strategic approach in order to thoroughly
discern and eradicate some evil; yet, in searching to be thorough enough the debunker will
become too thorough and in underpinning his enemies argument will also underpin his own.
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Satirism is essential to debunking because Burke finds that for one to shatter their opponent’s
policy, one must adopt a position whereby he could not logically advocate a position of his own
(147 PLF). The support of this idea traces back to Burke’s original assumption when discussing
debunking, any systematic build up will be met with a systematic let down. For one to get into a
place to debunk one must also adjust their own beliefs to gain a more dominant position and be
able to combat the existing frame. Burke says it is one's ability to pull their own punch by
refusing to apply their own line of questioning on his ideas that allow one to dissolve the position
of their opponents and maintain their own.
The satirical aspect of debunking, the fact that one who can debunk the dominant frame
must have already adopted part of the dominant position, is a result of the bureaucratic process
by which ideas spread (225 ATH). This creates a space for one's own frame to be undermined by
their arguments against the dominant frame and leads to a satirical effect in the case of
debunking. Burke writes that all orientations hold self-perpetuating qualities that also contain the
germs of its own dissolution (169 PC). Here a tie can be seen between Burke and Marx. Where
Marx discusses how the capitalistic frame produces the mechanism of its own downfall, Burke
applies this idea as something innate in all frames. He writes that new cultural enterprises will be
built upon the spiritual factors that have already been bureaucratized in an objective and material
order into society. These factors include things ranging from infrastructure to a grammar of
thought, and for a new frame to rise it must take possession of this “public equipment” (112
ATH). Burke’s ideas on debunking and the transition to frames of rejection seem to contradict
the idea that these frames really are true rejections of the dominant frame and its symbols of
authority.

57

The satirical elements Burke finds in debunking he associates with the reliance of a new
dominant frame, once a frame of rejection, on the old. Although a new frame might have been
born out of the rejection of the old symbols of authority in order to gain influence it does not
actually reject these symbols of authority. Frames that rise up and eventually replace a dominant
frame are not frames of rejection but are attitudes which seek to expand symbols of authority
once a frame has reached its Malthusian limit. The curve of history described by Burke is linear,
history’s progression the result of frames being driven to their Malthusian limit, and constantly
being expanded to never reach it. The Civil Rights Movement in the United States was a time of
great change in America, but it is difficult to classify the prevailing attitude behind the policy
passed and socially enacted from the movement as that of rejection. Martin Luther King Jr. and
his anti-capitalist, pro-equality rhetoric might be an attitude of rejection, but the message of
Martin Luther King Jr. as upheld by the movement and remembered today is not one of rejection.
Since the Civil Rights movement there has been change, but it has not been revolutionary. The
systematic oppression of all non-white citizens in America is still prevalent, just kept out of the
public eye to a greater degree. The civil rights movement did not reject the power systems in
place, just expanded it to cover those who had been previously ignored but who had gained
enough of a voice to make the dominant powers uncomfortable. The outgroup created by the
white male dominated system was reaching its limits and had to be broadened for power to be
held onto even if in the process that power had to be limited slightly. Although this is but one
example, any social change follows a similar pattern. Even if all previous rulers are thrown out
and the entire government changes, some hierarchy will remain, symbols of authority will
remain, the definitions will just have shifted. This is not rejection it is a transition, and it is why
Burke’s attitudes for the frame of rejection are just other attitudes during transitionary times.
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9. – Conclusion
Burke sees the unfolding of history as the shifting between frames by the rejection of
symbols of authority. He believes that attitudes will arise in people that either accept or reject
symbols of authority. Through the process of orientation and moral readings of narrative people
will come to exist in either an attitude of acceptance or rejection. Attitudes of acceptance will
attempt to maintain symbols of authority. They will resign those holding such an attitude to the
faults of the current system and try make the rejection of that system extremely unpleasant. The
institutional systems in place also support these attitudes. Public memory works to limit identity
and will be defined by the dominant group perspective. This works to limit the creation of new
values and as a result decreases the pressure of rejectionary forces on attitudes of acceptance. As
Burke discusses though, his theory of debunking stipulates that for any “systematic ‘build up’”
there will be a “systematic ‘let down’” (145 PLF). Attitudes of acceptance will create a class that
benefits from the symbols of authority it defends, but there will also be a cultural lag that creates
classes ignored and oppressed by the current frame. Burke claims that these classes will come to
hold an attitude of rejection to the current symbols of authority. As these attitudes gain
prevalence, they will push a dominant frame to its breaking point or what Burke calls its
Malthusian limit. As this point is reached transitionary attitudes will appear that seek to subvert
this transition by casuistically stretching a frame. Burke claims that this stretching can only go so
far though, and eventually a frame and its symbols of authority will be rejected. He makes this
claim about the limits of casuistic stretching because Burke approaches history from a wide lens.
He looks at times of transition as they appear during major ideological shifts. Although he noted
the slow build up to these shifts, he still sees a distinct shift between frames. By approaching
Burke’s work on a more micro level and studying the interaction between institutions and
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individuals this distinct shift becomes much less clear. It becomes apparent that there is no limit
to casuistic stretching, that there is no real rejection of symbols of authority. Attitudes of
rejection do not reject symbols of authority, because in order to gain support they must adopt
some of the position of these symbols of authority. Burke calls this process the bureaucracy of
the imagination and it requires that new ideas be built upon the structures of the old in order for
new moral arguments to fulfill what Fisher calls a narrative rationality. Due to this process strict
process for new idea formation controlled by the dominant class for any change to occur
attitudes of rejection must seek an expansion of symbols of authority. What attitudes of rejection
actually do is bring about transitionary forces that expand symbols of authority to make them
more acceptable to the classes that have arisen that are pushing a frame to its Malthusian limit.
At this point the dominant class will be forced to relinquish some control, but they will do this
because the other option is destruction. The dominant class will always choose to stretch
symbols of authority rather than see them, and the current frame ever truly be destroyed. They
have the power to do this based upon the nature of their hegemony and the narratological control
it entails. From these findings it can be determined the frames and symbols of authority have
been fluid in application but constant throughout history. History is not made up of shifts
between frames based upon the rejection of symbols of authority, rather it is the slow and
constant expansion of these symbols of authority and the evolution of the dominant frame as a
result.
The current ideological position of the United States is certainly problematic, but it is not
new. Although transitional forces feel particularly strong right now, they are always at work.
That being said, solutions still need to be found that can help propel this country out of the
quagmire of argument it is stuck in. Although symbols of authority cannot be rejected the role of
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attitudes of rejection and transition can still work to expand them to better situate the citizens of
the US. By better understanding the oppressive nature of the symbol systems that bind people
together people can come to sympathize with those holding other attitudes. By coming to terms
with our differences we can come together to make things better for everyone.
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